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JINNAH AND THE THEATRE OF POLITICS 
Faisal Devji, Oxford University 
Abstract  
In this essay I will look at the way in which Pakistan’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, managed 
to lead Muslims without claiming to resemble them in any way. His heretical background, 
anglicized character, and sheer arrogance instead served to augment rather than detract from 
Jinnah’s popularity, because he represented a politics based on novelty rather than heredity, 
artifice rather than authenticity. Muslim politics in colonial India was founded upon the rejection 
of blood-and-soil forms of nationality, which could only define the Prophet’s followers there as a 
minority and not a nation. Pakistan therefore had to be fought for in the purely ideal terms of a 
political logic, whose iconic representation was to be found in the biography of the man hailed as 
its creator. 
Introduction 
It is possible to imagine India achieving independence without a Gandhi or 
Nehru at the helm, and in fact historians routinely quarrel about what freedom 
might have looked like for her without these founding fathers. But nobody has 
ever been able to think of Pakistan’s birth without Mohammad Ali Jinnah. 
Indeed historians regularly argue that if Jinnah had died a year before he actually 
did, Pakistan may never have come into being. Though far less influential 
internationally than his illustrious rivals, Jinnah is the one indispensable figure 
in the history of India as much as Pakistan.  
Jinnah’s career serves to exemplify an extraordinarily dynamic period in 
the political life of India, when the limits not only of European imperialism, but 
of liberal nationalism, as well, were being tested in creative ways much beyond 
the tradition of British political thought. For in many ways his radically novel 
idea of Pakistan, with its lack of any prior history, conceptual as much as 
geographical, and with its two wings audaciously separated by a thousand miles 
of Indian territory, belonged to the twentieth century world of ideological 
politics on a global scale. Indeed Pakistan can be said to have appeared on the 
world’s map so as to confound any naturalized vision of the nation-state, 
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dispensing as it did with every notion of territorial or cultural integrity for a 
political artifice.    
Pakistan does not belong in the nineteenth century context of nationalism, 
with its emphasis on common histories, geographies and traditions that were 
based on language or ethnicity. And I shall argue here that the abstract and even 
empty identity that constituted the single foundation for this country can be 
found mirrored in the biography of its founding father. For by his words as much 
as his character, Jinnah represented a denial of blood-and-soil forms of 
nationalism that relied upon notions of heredity, authenticity and intimacy. 
Whether by accident or design, Jinnah was the perfect father for a Pakistan 
created as a piece of theatre, the representation of an idea that had little if 
anything to do with the kind of nationalism characterized by deep histories and 
geographical continuities—all of which could only bind Muslims to an India in 
which they were forever doomed to be a minority.     
The obscurity of origins 
Ever since he entered public life in the early years of the last century, Jinnah’s 
character had been defined by an apparent contradiction. He was remarkably 
reticent about his background and private life on the one hand, while being 
flamboyant in his dress and comportment on the other.1 This contradiction could 
be seen in every part of Jinnah’s personality, with his well-known shyness and 
sensitivity being compensated for by a sometimes rude and always self-assured 
manner. This character trait allowed Jinnah to make of Indian politics a piece of 
theatre whose action concealed as much as it revealed. His friends as well as 
enemies strove throughout Jinnah’s career to understand not only what he was 
really up to but also who he really was. Jinnah himself was determined to remain 
an enigma. He wrote very little, apart from speeches, a few articles and brief, 
workaday letters, extraordinary in a period when Indian leaders like Gandhi and 
Nehru wrote tomes.  
While it was no doubt born out of his own experience and psychology, this 
contradiction of personality might also have had something to do with Jinnah’s 
ethnic and religious background. For the man who would be acclaimed as the 
Qaid-e-Azam or Great Leader of his people was in fact the most unlikely of 
1  These and other details, which are repeated in all the accounts of his life, can be found in the 
most thorough biography of Jinnah. See WOLPERT, 1984. 
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Muslim politicians, coming as he did from a small community of Gujarati 
traders who declared one of the most heretical versions of Islam as their 
ancestral faith. A branch of the minority Shia sect, the Ismaili creed professed by 
these Khoja merchants dispensed with the religious law altogether and was open 
to considering Muhammad and his successors as incarnations of ostensibly 
Hindu deities like Vishnu. Indeed the Khojas rarely used the name Muslim for 
themselves, though they acknowledged Islam as their religion in some wise.  
Out of step with the majority of India’s Muslims, and even execrated by 
many among them, the Khojas emerged as a prosperous and influential trading 
community in cities like Bombay and Karachi during the nineteenth century, 
finding their business partners and clients among Hindus, Jains, Parsis and other 
Shia or Gujarati Muslim merchant groups. All this was true of Jinnah’s father, a 
Karachi businessman hailing from the small Hindu princely state of Gondal. 
Given their relative distance from what passed as Muslim norms in India, and 
their greater intimacy with Hindu mores in particular, it had always struck men 
like Gandhi and Nehru as astounding that the Khojas could have produced a 
leader like Jinnah, whom they very frequently described as being more Hindu 
than Muslim. And in this they were quite correct, since Nehru, scion of a family 
that had served the Mughals, represented the dominant Muslim culture of North 
India in his dress and language, while Gandhi was certainly more knowledgeable 
about the Quran and Muslim devotions than the famously irreligious Jinnah. 
Jinnah’s Khoja background necessarily made his claims regarding both 
Hindus and Muslims into histrionic ones, since his intimacy was and in fact in 
his closest friendships continued to be with Hindus, Parsis, Christians and other 
Shias rather than with the vast population of Sunnis that he claimed to represent. 
Jinnah’s intimate self, in other words, stood at some distance from his public 
persona. As a Khoja, Jinnah’s relations with the majority of India’s Muslims 
were distant apart from any personal inclination, while his links with Hindus in 
particular were close and even intimate. His partisanship of the country’s 
Muslims had little to do with any personal experience or identification with 
them. Indeed it was precisely his distant and as it were “secular” definition of 
Islam that allowed Jinnah to transform Muslim identity into a modern and non-
theological political form. And given the ambiguous position that he occupied 
between Hindus and Muslims, it is not surprising that Jinnah came to be 
convinced that it was the intimacy between these groups that made them 
vulnerable to hurt from each other and posed the greatest political problem for 
India. 
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One of Jinnah’s great enemies, the Hindu nationalist leader Savarkar, made 
the same kind of argument in his polemical tract of 1926 called Hindutva, where 
he argued that while Hinduism was by its nature pluralistic and tolerant, it was 
the otherwise admirable intimacy that groups such as the Khojas enjoyed with its 
followers that forced the latter to draw a line excluding outsiders from their inner 
being, though of course the Khojas were free to rejoin the parent body of Hin-
duism and be welcomed into it.2 Jinnah eventually reached the same conclusion, 
to sunder the ties of a cruel brotherhood that bound India’s two great religions 
together with the hurt of fraternal betrayal, so that a genuine friendship could 
emerge in its place. This intimacy was on full view in Jinnah’s relations with 
Gandhi, which were marked precisely by their regional, linguistic and trading-
caste commonalities. The President of the Muslim League would assert that he 
knew how to deal with the Mahatma of the Indian National Congress, since he 
spoke to him as a Khoja did to a Banya, which is to say as a member of one 
Gujarati trading community to another.3  
Acting the part 
For someone who was admired as well as accused in later years of being so 
highly westernized in his language, attitudes and behaviour, Jinnah came from a 
completely Indian family background in which English was neither spoken nor 
indeed understood. Eventually his father picked up enough English to do 
business with British companies, and the young Mohammad Ali and his siblings 
are described by his sister, Fatima, as imitating the sound of English con-
versation: ish-phish-ish-phish-yes being answered with ish-phish-ish-phish-no.4 
Even at the end of his life, by which time English had long become his preferred 
language, Jinnah neither spoke nor wrote it with any degree of sustained 
accuracy. And while his knowledge of Urdu, the official language of Muslim 
nationalism, was poor, Jinnah apparently spoke Gujarati and Kutchi beautifully 
if never in public, and seems even to have had a working knowledge of Persian, 
which he sometimes interjected into Urdu speeches when he could not remember 
the grammatical gender of certain words. 
2  SAVARKAR, 1966: 101–102. 
3  KHAN, 1976: 44. 
4  JINNAH, 1987: 48. 
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This disparity between his formidably anglicized demeanour, so utterly 
convincing to most observers, and a fundamental inability to assume complete 
mastery over the culture of the Raj, was also evident in other aspects of Jinnah’s 
life. So his Calcutta lieutenant, M. A. H. Ispahani tells us that when he once 
offered to get Jinnah some bowties on a trip to Paris, his leader surprised him in 
admitting that he used ready-made ones, after which Ispahani taught Jinnah to tie 
these signs of European high culture by practising doing so around his thigh.5 It 
was almost as if Jinnah, far from rejecting his background to become a “brown 
Englishman,” was content to treat his westernized self as a kind of role there to 
convince others but not pushed beyond the bounds of theatre to become a form 
of conversion or self-delusion. And theatre in this sense was of the essence in 
Jinnah’s personality, allowing him to advance a persona while retreating from it 
at the same time, and to make audacious decisions or outrageous claims as part 
of the spectacle of politics.  
This character trait became evident early in Jinnah’s life. When this son of 
a petty trader who had done well was sent off to London as an apprentice to a 
firm of port wine merchants with whom his father did business, he suddenly 
decided to abandon a promising commercial career and, much against his 
father’s wishes, become a lawyer. The only other future he had envisaged for 
himself was that of an actor, with Jinnah confessing that his great ambition had 
been to play Romeo on stage.6 Given his early political career as the “am-
bassador of Hindu-Muslim unity”, this choice of character is illuminating, since 
apart from being a lover, Romeo is a tragic hero who sought two reconcile two 
warring families but succeeds only in undoing himself in the process. Savarkar, 
writing at around the same time as Jinnah had left a Congress that had been 
revolutionized under Gandhi’s leadership, would also refer to Romeo and Juliet 
to describe the intimacy of religious conflict in India.7 
Jinnah’s love for theatre, both Bombay’s Gujarati-language stage and the 
English one of Shakespeare, Wilde and Shaw, was evident from his library and 
conversation. Facing a choice between the stage and the law, he opted for the 
latter, and in doing so only chose a version of the stage. The young Jinnah was 
fascinated by the sheer theatre of politics, and saw the law as his ticket of entry 
into this world dominated by his social superiors. For as the patrician Nehru, a 
graduate of Harrow and Cambridge, would sneeringly remark in times to come, 
5  ISPAHANI, 1967: 99. 
6  JINNAH, 1987: 80. 
7  SAVARKAR, 1966: 1–2. 
1184 FAISAL DEVJI 
AS/EA LXVII•4•2013, S. 1179–1203 
Jinnah was man of no cultivation or systematic reading, having never been to a 
university. In this he was much like Gandhi, both being autodidacts from tra-
ditional mercantile backgrounds, though the Mahatma’s recourse to the language 
of native authenticity made him acceptable to Nehru by the same token that 
Jinnah’s claim to the west rankled in him.  
A dandy’s code of honour 
By the time Jinnah returned to Karachi as a newly minted barrister, both his 
mother and the young wife to whom his marriage had been arranged just before 
he had left for London were dead, and his father on the verge of bankruptcy. 
Taking charge of the family, he managed to set up a precarious legal practice in 
Bombay and moved them all there, ensconcing his father and younger siblings in 
Khoja Mohallah, the traditional community neighbourhood in the “native 
quarter,” while he took modest rooms in the colonial city near Apollo Bunder, 
where the Gateway of India stands today. India’s great commercial metropolis, 
Bombay exerted a magnetic attraction for all those who wished to make their 
name and fortune, with Jinnah just one of many young men drawn there from 
provincial towns like Karachi. He behaved in exactly the way that the son of an 
Indian trader was expected to, working hard to support his suddenly impo-
verished family, educating his brothers and sisters and eventually marrying most 
of them off.  
But the young man whose family lived in Khoja Mohallah was a very 
different individual from the aspiring lawyer who lived in the colonial city and 
was soon to become a rising star of the Indian National Congress. And in this 
sense the fact that Jinnah’s life was divided between two very different parts of 
Bombay was indicative of his ambiguous personality more generally. For while 
Jinnah did not seem to be particularly close to his family, apart from his father 
and sister Fatima, he was impeccable in doing his duty by them. Similarly, he 
appears to have had little fondness for the city’s various “native” mohallahs or 
quarters, though he depended upon them for much of his career. For Jinnah was 
a representative of Bombay’s Muslims in the separate religious electorates that 
were created by the British just before the First World War, and gradually 
expanded by the colonial state until its dissolution.   
But if Jinnah did not bring the world of the mohallah to his practice at the 
Bombay High Court, neither did he simply accommodate himself to that 
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institution’s conventions and expectations, displaying instead a propensity to 
outrage the very respectability he seems otherwise to have craved. More than a 
propensity, this desire to claim the norms of a certain culture only to break them 
may be described as an urge fundamental to Jinnah’s personality, one that was 
evident in this initial phase of his legal career in the young Mohammad Ali’s 
unprecedentedly rude and risky remarks in court to judges both British and 
Indian. It was the kind of arrogance that was taken as a sign of nationalism once 
Jinnah’s political career had begun, but that he exercised far more routinely and 
generally with no political intent. By such behaviour Jinnah may have sought to 
outrage the very society into which he wanted admittance, but not because he 
had already mastered its ways and become an insider. On the contrary, he ap-
pears to have entertained a degree of contempt for the insider’s conventionality, 
and sought to guard against it by stressing the sheer individuality of his will. 
This high-risk strategy of pushing the margins of respectability, and 
therefore situating himself at their edges, also took the form of dandyism, with 
Jinnah fashioning himself into an exquisitely dressed gentleman of a distinct 
kind, laconic and epigrammatic. This studied and possibly ironic pose, complete 
with monocle and cigarette holder, was much commented upon during his life-
time, when journalists, for example, often prefaced their weightiest interviews of 
Jinnah with descriptions of his elegance, as if they were writing for society 
magazines. Whether in European or Indian dress, Jinnah flouted sartorial con-
vention. On the one hand his two-tone shoes and double-breasted suits with their 
exaggerated lapels belonged more to the fashionable man about town than to the 
lawyer and politician that he actually was. On the other hand Jinnah’s north 
Indian sherwani was topped by a karakuli cap, which not only bore a striking 
resemblance to the cap still worn at prayer by the Khojas of Bombay, but which 
was also donned at a rakish angle as if in defiance of religious opinion, for 
which this indicated a dissolute character.  
Dandyism, its first great theorist Charles Baudelaire tells us, emerges 
during times of transition, when the position of entire social classes is shifting, 
and certain men find themselves caught between them.8 Thrown upon his own 
devices rather than the conventions of inheritance, the dandy’s art is as much 
about the discipline of self-making as it is about ephemeral pleasures. Jinnah’s 
dandyism was also a form of stern discipline, as ascetic in its own way as any of 
Gandhi’s habits. And the discipline he showed in his dress and deportment, 
making no concessions to comfort and the Indian climate, was mirrored in every 
8  BAUDELAIRE, 2005: 28. 
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aspect of his political life. This included a rigorous schedule as well as otherwise 
pointless and even obsessive activities like painstakingly filling out receipts for 
the most minor sums donated to the League or turning off unnecessary lights.        
Together with his appearance and behaviour came a distinctive speaking 
style, one that carried effect even when Jinnah was not being rude. As we may 
expect, what he was most concerned about in his public utterances was the 
theatre of appearances, and Jinnah’s courtroom manner is still recalled as part of 
the Bombay High Court’s lore. Because his voice was not very strong, Jinnah 
varied its timbre and emphasized the cadences of his delivery, which he 
accompanied by arresting gestures. What he eventually produced thereby was a 
unique mode of political speech in a time that came to be dominated by leaders 
declaiming from balconies to assembled masses. Of course none of the leaders 
who dominated Indian opinion during the age of mass politics in the 1930s and 
‘40s, Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah, ever made use of declamation or its militaristic 
potential, with Gandhi speaking in a rather monotonous and matter of fact way, 
while Nehru imitated a certain high-flown and high-pitched English style with 
the kind of fidelity that Jinnah despised.  
Jinnah’s prose, marked as it was with grammatical infelicities, was neither 
as spare as Gandhi’s nor as rhetorically accomplished as Nehru’s. But what it 
lacked by way of content was more than made up for by a dramatic delivery and 
fine use of silence. Indeed Jinnah is the only one of the three about whose 
speaking style we have a great deal of description and commentary, all of which 
concurs in stating that its power resided not in projecting the force of Jinnah’s 
personality outwards with his voice, but rather in drawing an audience inwards 
by the deployment of low and sometimes almost inaudible tones. 9  In fact 
Jinnah’s oratorical secret seems to have been his ability to turn even speeches to 
mammoth audiences into the kind of private, exclusive and even intimate 
performances that might be associated with courtrooms and drawing rooms. His 
low but perfectly modulated voice and elegance of gesture apparently trans-
formed large and rambunctious Indian crowds into quiet and attentive audiences, 
to the extent that during Jinnah’s speeches we hear almost none of the exhort-
tations to silence and discipline that were so common at Gandhi’s or Nehru’s 
public appearances.  
Reducing one’s interlocutors to silence, which is something Jinnah did 
quite regularly not only to his audiences but also his associates in the working 
committee of the Muslim League, is not necessarily a democratic skill, though it 
9  See, for instance, MORAES, 1976: 181. 
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certainly demonstrates the hypnotic quality of Jinnah’s charisma. And indeed 
when he met Gandhi for their last session of intense negotiations in 1944, the 
Mahatma greeted Jinnah by saying that he had “mesmerised the Muslims,” to 
which the Great Leader of his people responded by remarking that Gandhi had 
“hypnotized the Hindus,” each man seeming to realize that however hedged it 
might be by the procedures of democratic institutions like political parties, his 
power in drawing the adulation of millions derived from a quite different 
source.10 Of course all this was to come in the future, but it is clear that Jinnah’s 
political style had its origins in his early career, when the only audiences he 
sought to dominate were to be found in courtrooms and drawing rooms. 
Representing the future 
A rising star in India’s political firmament, hailed by the poetess and Congress 
propagandist Sarojini Naidu, one of his many female admirers, as the “am-
bassador of Hindu-Muslim unity,” Jinnah truly represented the future of India 
herself in a period whose end coincided with that of the First World War. He 
envisioned his task as bringing Muslims into the mainstream of Indian politics. 
Then divided into many associations, some of the “modern” among these 
followers of the Prophet were gathered in the Muslim League. The party had 
been founded in 1906, by a collection of Bombay-based Shia merchants, rich 
aristocrats and anglicized North Indian Sunnis, to defend Muslim interests once 
the British had announced the introduction of limited political representation. 
Jinnah thought that India’s vast Muslim population possessed no politics of its 
own, and he was determined to have it play its proper role in the struggle for 
India’s freedom. His great triumph in this endeavour came with the Lucknow 
Pact in 1916, which brought Congress and League together on a single platform 
and allowed for a common membership between them. 
Even after he had abandoned the Congress in 1920, Jinnah did not cease to 
work for a political agreement between Hindus and Muslims, though what he 
meant by this was a genuine coming together and not merely the latter’s dis-
solution in a Hindu-dominated Congress, which he thought was only a recipe for 
future confrontation. His last such effort was made during the 1937 elections, 
when, despite his estrangement of more than a decade from the Congress, Jinnah 
10  AL MUJAHID, 2007: 90. 
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returned from his English exile and took over the Muslim League, with a view to 
bringing it closer to the former. Even when he had become Congress’s greatest 
enemy, Jinnah continued to hold up Hindu politicians, and the party that he 
thought they dominated, as models for Muslims.11 Indeed with the exception of 
the Prophet’s followers in Bombay, among whose trading communities he 
counted himself, Jinnah was openly and routinely contemptuous of the gene-
rality of Indian Muslims, as far as their intellectual and political skills were 
concerned, holding them to be treacherous, greedy, swayed by emotions and 
worst of all, lacking faith in themselves.12 Given his opinion of them, as well as 
his own singular character, Jinnah’s claim to represent Muslims had little to do 
with any identity, history, culture or even interest that he might be said to share 
with his constituents. Instead his charisma seemed to derive from the very 
immensity of the difference between the leader and the led.  
Insofar as Jinnah can be said to have represented Muslims at all, he did so 
in the way a lawyer does his clients, which is to say by focussing on their 
objective interests and from outside their own sense of themselves. Indeed he 
had little patience with the existential aspect of identity and always sought to 
turn what he considered its accidental facts into political principles. This 
lawyerly style of leadership seems to have been understood by Jinnah’s Muslim 
followers, who remained undeterred by all attempts to tar him as a half-English 
heretic who ate pork and drank alcohol. So when the retired civil servant Sir 
Malcolm Darling embarked upon a horseback tour of northern India in 1946, 
speaking with country folk about their visions of the future, one of his Muslim 
interlocutors in the Punjab responded to a question about Jinnah’s distance from 
Islamic norms by repeating the Qaid’s own statement. Jinnah, he said, was a 
good Muslim leader because he could speak to Gandhi as a Khoja spoke to a 
Banya. In other words it was the Qaid-e-Azam’s intimacy with his Hindu 
enemies that in the eyes of this pious Muslim made him an ideal leader.13 
As their lawyer, Jinnah thought that the problem with Muslims was their 
propensity to being seduced by petty theological issues and an outdated cultural 
or historical sensibility, thus forsaking what he imagined as their preordained 
role in the politics of India. This role had to do with Muslims performing their 
duty as India’s chief minority in order to keep the majority true to their country’s 
plural society. What interested Jinnah, in other words, was not the Muslim or 
11  For an example see AHMAD, 1942: 72. 
12  See, for instance, descriptions of this view in KHURSHID, 1990: 35, and SULERI, 1945: 54–55. 
13  DARLING, 2011: 107. 
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even religious nature of this minority, but rather the way in which its con-
stitutional position could be transformed into a political principle. And if Jinnah 
was used to accusing his fellow Muslims of degrading their community by 
stressing doctrinal matters over political ones, he appears to have felt real be-
trayal only when his Hindu friends in the Congress started doing the same under 
Gandhi’s influence. Whatever else it was about, Jinnah’s lifelong quarrel with 
the Mahatma had its alleged origin in the latter’s attempt to reduce India’s 
Muslims into a merely religious minority and thus deprive them of a political 
principle.   
While Jinnah was certainly irritated by what he saw as Gandhi’s dan-
gerously unrealistic politics, this was not sufficient to provide the cause of his 
disenchantment with Congress. It was instead the Mahatma’s first great move-
ment of non-cooperation in 1919, which included the mobilization of Muslims 
for the cause of the caliphate, now supposedly at risk following the Ottoman 
Empire’s defeat in the First World War, which seems to have particularly hor-
rified Jinnah. Like the Hindu nationalists who tended to be his friends, Jinnah 
saw the Khilafat Movement as being a piece of political hypocrisy by which 
Gandhi obtained Muslim support for a reactionary cause, and in the process gave 
Muslim divines and their divisive theological concerns a political platform for 
the first time. Savarkar’s book Hindutva was written precisely during this period 
to pose a Hindu politics against this new Muslim one. In later years ideologists 
of the Muslim League like the journalist Z. A. Suleri would see the Khilafat 
Movement, ostensibly the high point of Muslim mobilization in India, as nothing 
more than a “butchery” of their political life, even describing it as an absorption 
into “the fold of Hindudom.”14 
Unlike the Hindu nationalists, however, Jinnah’s objections had to do with 
what he thought was the Mahatma’s aim, reducing Muslims to a merely religious 
minority with no political principle or contribution of their own to the cause of 
India’s freedom. He had not minded supporting the cause of a defeated Turkey 
against the colonial desires of victorious Britain and France, and like other Shia 
politicians of the time was thoroughly ecumenical in upholding the rights of a 
caliph who was considered nothing more than an illegitimate usurper within 
their sect. But to bring Islam into politics in order to bolster Congress, was, he 
considered, a foolish and ultimately dangerous move for all concerned, and one 
that forced him out of the party forever. The break was made in good theatrical 
style, after he stood up to Gandhi during the Congress’s annual session in 1920 
14  SULERI, 1945: 41, 53. 
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and, to the jeers and physical threats of the Mahatma’s new Muslim allies, 
accused him of bringing religion into politics.15   
Fallen Angel 
Having left Congress, Jinnah dallied for over decade with other political parties 
formed among those conservatives and Hindu nationalists, like Motilal Nehru or 
Madan Mohan Malaviya, who were also exiles from it. But after the Round 
Table Conferences of the early 1930s that were meant to bring India’s various 
interests into constitutional agreement, Jinnah decided to settle in England and 
practice before the Privy Council. The 1935 Government of India Act that 
resulted from these conferences, and pleased none of India’s parties, widened the 
franchise further and called for elections to be held under separate electorates in 
1937. Asked by a divided Muslim leadership to return and lead the Muslim 
League in these elections, Jinnah acceded and embarked upon a campaign to 
purge the party of “reactionaries,” fill it with Congress Muslims and popularize 
it in alignment with the Congress, with which he had reached an informal, 
power-sharing agreement. Congress emerged from the 1937 elections as the 
country’s largest single party, though one that had not managed to secure the 
majority of the Muslim vote, which went instead to regional parties in Muslim 
majority provinces like the Punjab and Bengal. The Muslim League, in the 
meantime, though it had not won over the Muslim majority provinces, had done 
very well in areas where Muslims were in a minority, and so Jinnah fully 
expected to be taken into ministries in those provinces where they were a 
significant if not overwhelming force.  
The Congress was entirely within its rights to refuse such an alliance, given 
its fears of internal division, which might prove vulnerable to a British policy of 
“divide and rule”.  But the party went further and announced that it would be 
happy to include Muslim Leaguers who renounced their allegiance to sign the 
Congress pledge, with Nehru even going so far as to make unwise comments 
about the League disappearing from Indian politics altogether. For Jinnah, this 
was not only a betrayal, but also what he described as a fascist and dictatorial 
tactic to eliminate opposition parties by a politics of bribery and blackmail, with 
the Muslims’ true representatives, the Leaguers for whom they had voted, being 
15  For a description see ALVI, 1976: 60. 
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replaced by token Congress Muslims. He saw in this procedure nothing more 
than an attempt to destroy India’s political plurality, or rather reduce it to a 
merely religious, ethnic or caste diversity. His own politics, by contrast, had 
always been about transcending the materiality of such identities and anchoring 
them to a political principle so general that it could be represented by anyone. 
This was to be his last disappointment with Congress, for shortly after-
wards Jinnah abandoned the language of minority rights altogether to announce 
that the Muslims were a nation, and thus to be dealt with on the basis of parity 
rather than by the counting of heads. Not coincidentally, this rejection of 
minority politics occurred once the internationalism of the League of Nations, 
with its famous minorities protections, entered into crisis with the rise of fascist 
wars in Europe and imperialist ones abroad. By 1940 Jinnah was asking for a 
vaguely defined state or states, independent or simply autonomous, in which this 
new nation could find a home. The name eventually adopted for this state had 
been thought up a decade earlier by a Cambridge undergraduate, and though it 
meant something like “land of the pure” was also an acronym describing 
“Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan,” with Bengal, the most 
populous Muslim province, being conspicuously absent. Jinnah’s task was now 
to get the Muslim majority provinces to support the League and thus make it an 
equal player with Congress in Indian politics.16  
As founder of the “two nation” theory, Jinnah was often asked how 
Muslims constituted one. His standard response, running down a list of national 
characteristics, was always perfunctory, ending in the assertion that Muslims 
alone could fitly be described as a nation. But given the dispersed and diverse 
character of India’s Muslim population, Jinnah’s idea of nationality could have 
no blood-and-soil connotation, since history, geography and everything con-
nected to them served to relate rather than distinguish Muslims from Hindus, and 
in doing so allow them to remain nothing more than a minority. Muslim 
nationality instead resided in nothing but the will alone, a self-sustaining and 
indeed devilish quality appropriately represented not only by Jinnah’s own cha-
racter, but also by his clear rejection even of the Islamic past and India’s Muslim 
history in particular, which he on occasion compared to British imperialism.17 
And this completely “unnatural” concept of nationality also made the Muslim 
“homeland” for which Jinnah fought a mere instrument of the national will, with 
16  This argument is detailed in JALAL, 1994. 
17  For an example see AHMAD, 1942: 161. 
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Pakistan able to derive neither name nor notion from any past real or imagined. 
Indeed for Jinnah crucial about Pakistan was precisely that it was unprecedented.  
We might say that only by rejecting what was given them by nature and 
history could India’s Muslims exchange the role of minority for that of nation, if 
this latter was defined by religion conceived of not as the attribute of any 
particular population but rather as a universal idea or even an ideology. But if 
Muslim nationalism was to present itself as an ideology, or at least an idea 
transcending all that was given a people by history or nature, it could not be 
religious in any conventional sense. And it was this lack of religious familiarity 
in the Muslim League that explains its rejection by so many Muslim clerics, who 
preferred supporting the Indian National Congress, which was pledged to 
continue the colonial policy of granting them jurisdiction over an Islam defined 
by personal law and ritual practice. It also explains Jinnah’s much discussed and 
yet inexplicably popular lack of religious feeling, which for him was simply an 
historical accident that made a national will possible among India’s Muslims.   
In an interview with the Daily Herald on the 14th of August, 1942, Jinnah 
responded to a question about the possibility of a compromise between Hindus 
and Muslims with an epigram: Hindus want to worship the cow while Muslims 
want to eat it.18 Far from being a statement simply dismissive of Indian pre-
judices, Jinnah’s laconic response actually takes them seriously. Unlike Gandhi, 
who took such prejudices seriously by trying to build a compromise between 
them, Jinnah wanted to dissolve them altogether by addressing the constitutional 
situation that he thought provided their basis. This was a situation in which 
various interests and constituencies, religious, regional and caste-based, had 
been created by imperialism in such a manner that turning India into a national 
state on some European model would annihilate the weakest among them. A 
national state of this kind would be Hindu by default rather than by intent, 
because its elimination of constitutional privileges like separate electorates by a 
communal majority would affect only minority groups as disadvantages.  
The problem of India, thought Jinnah, was that it had adopted the language 
of democratic nationalism, with its majorities and minorities, in a situation 
where neither democracy nor nationality existed. But it was more than colo-
nialism that prevented such a nation from coming into being, since constituting 
as they did a gargantuan population of 70 millions which also formed absolute 
majorities in a number of provinces, India’s Muslims could by no means be 
considered a minority without deforming this term out of recognition. A 
18  AHMAD, 1960: 409. 
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constitutional solution to this problem was required, therefore, which for Jinnah 
meant nothing less than what he called a social contract. But this was only 
possible if all parties to the contract negotiated from a position of equality. Thus 
Jinnah’s demands for parity in the discussions leading to independence, which 
Indian nationalists considered a disingenuous ploy to deny their numerical 
majority. On his part Jinnah saw in Congress’ attempts to refuse him parity a 
demonstration of Hindu dominance, since it was a specifically confessional 
majority that was being used to force a weaker community into the position of 
minority even before the establishment of a national state, one which he thought 
should be founded upon the heartfelt agreement of its constituting parts.   
Jinnah accused the Congress of being idealistic by refusing to take Indian 
realities seriously. But he remained true to the Congress creed in other ways, a 
loyalty we can see demonstrated most clearly and ironically in the demand for 
Pakistan. One of Jinnah’s catchphrases in the making of this demand was that 
the freedom of Pakistan presupposed that of India.19 Giving priority to Indian 
freedom here meant not that the Muslim League would hold up her inde-
pendence until its demand for Pakistan was met, but rather that India could only 
be free as the kind of state Congress wanted it to be with Pakistan as its neigh-
bour. Otherwise, whether as a centralized or federated state, it would only be 
some version of an empire, Mughal or British in form, where politics meant the 
state’s manipulation of autonomous groups which were unable to constitute a 
citizenry. The freedom of Pakistan, therefore, meant the freedom of India, 
because in splitting the Subcontinent’s enormous Muslim population between 
both countries, it would make possible the creation of “proper” majorities and 
minorities in each one, and thus a secular citizenship as well. So in the new 
India, for instance, Muslims would suddenly cease to exist as a nation and 
become what Jinnah called a sub-national minority, as too would Hindus in 
Pakistan.    
The Qaid refused to consider a large-scale transfer of populations between 
India and Pakistan until the violence of partition forced him to agree to what we 
would today call the “ethnic cleansing” of a divided Punjab. Indeed he wanted 
the two countries to retain effective minorities for the sake of their own freedom, 
for only in this way, he said in an address to the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan in 1948, would Hindus cease to be Hindus politically and Muslims 
cease to be Muslims, both becoming the citizens of their respective states in a 
19  For an example see AHMAD, 1942: 165. 
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real sense, because of and not despite the other’s presence.20 Only by eliminating 
what he thought were the impossible majorities and minorities of colonial India 
by its partitioning, could these religious groups lose their stranglehold on the 
region’s politics and subside into civil society. And this would allow real 
democracies to emerge there by making possible the creation and destruction of 
temporary majorities and minorities based on a variety of different interests.  
Apart from making a democratic citizenship possible, Jinnah thought that 
the minorities in India and Pakistan might also constitute a link between the two 
countries, one that could provide a basis for the relations and indeed mutual 
dependence of both. This scheme, branded by Congress supporters as the 
keeping of hostages, succeeded neither as an attempt to keep the Hindu and Sikh 
areas of Bengal and Punjab, provinces that the League claimed in their entirety, 
nor to retain such populations in other parts of what became Pakistan. This 
failure to shape the future of the state he had created can be blamed not only on 
the recalcitrance of others but on the abstract idealism of Jinnah’s own ideas. For 
Jinnah’s ostensibly hard-headed political realism, one that disdained Congress 
calls for communal harmony as woolly idealism, was itself the most utopian of 
dreams dedicated to making visions like the social contract into political 
realities. 
Satan incarnate 
The originality of Jinnah’s political style, relying upon affectation and disdain, is 
made evident in books like Z. A. Suleri’s My Leader, which appeared in 1945 
with a drawing of Jinnah in high hauteur on its cover. The book’s first chapter 
begins with a list of accusing quotations from Jinnah’s enemies. “Jinnah Sahib is 
vain […] Prouder than the proudest of Pharaohs […] He is an egoist who would 
own no equal […] Arrogant and uncompromising […].” To these Suleri 
responds in the following way: “Precisely this ‘proudest of Pharaohs,’ this 
‘egoist,’ this ‘India’s political enemy Number One,’ this ‘arrogant and 
uncompromising,’ this ‘disruptor of India,’ this ‘essentially bad man’ is MY 
LEADER.” If Suleri can exult in his leader’s demonization, it is because he 
recognized in the man’s elegant disdain a force of negation that would break the 
language of Indian politics down to its most basic parts, so as to make what 
20  BURKE, 2000: 29. 
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Jinnah called a “social contract” out of the colony’s state of nature. It is this 
force of negation that the great man’s vanity exhibits, a demonic force that 
makes for an iconography full of grim and unflattering images, quite different 
from the handsome and urbane gentleman that we know Jinnah to have also 
been. 
Quite different, too, from the iconography surrounding “father (bapu)” 
Gandhi and “uncle (chacha)” Nehru, the latter being acute enough to recognize 
negation as Jinnah’s greatest political weapon.21 Of course Jinnah imagined as 
an indomitable will in a frail body, an image calling for both obedience and 
protection approaches the cult of the Mahatma. But Jinnah’s will is indomitable 
in the most self-consciously secular and civilian way, which is why it is satanic 
in Milton’s sense, upheld by nothing but itself. And it is ambition, pride and 
other qualities of satanic solitude that make Jinnah heroic in a peculiarly modern 
sense, a heroism that the poet of Muslim nationalism, Mohammad Iqbal, 
glorified precisely in the figure of the Devil.22 For if certain mystics and poets in 
the past had seen in the Devil’s refusal to bow before Adam at God’s command 
a sign of his greater devotion to the latter, Iqbal made of Satan a modern hero, 
one whose disobedience signalled the virtue of independence or freedom, as well 
as the willingness to suffer for his convictions. And Jinnah, I want to argue, 
comes to fit this new, satanic image of heroism for India’s Muslims, who were 
under few illusions about his heretical background, propensity to alcohol and 
pork and disinclination to pray. 
Jinnah’s rise to eminence was made possible by the increasingly parochial 
politics of the once dominant Muslim gentry in northern India, and by the 
political emergence on a country-wide scale of Muslim groups in other parts of 
the land. Jinnah himself was from one of these new groups, the merchants of 
Gujarat and Bombay, and his achievement was to bring them together with 
gentry, aristocrats and professional men from other regions, to lead the first 
popular party in India’s Muslim history. It was entirely appropriate, then, that 
this most unrepresentative Muslim should come to lead a party in which no 
group could claim to represent any other. It was the disparate character of the 
Muslim League that Jinnah’s political style, his satanic solitude, addressed in the 
most original way. For might not his dandyism have counter-posed a self-
fashioned and wilful sense of Muslim individuality to some impossible 
Muslimhood made up of common characteristics like belief, ritual or everyday 
21  NEHRU, 1999: 390. 
22  See, for example, the poem “Jibril-o Iblis” in IQBAL, 1997: 435. 
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practices? Jinnah represented neither the Muslim past nor present, but perhaps, 
in the man’s very departure from his community’s various norms, nothing more 
than the future that was being imagined for it.  
In one respect Jinnah’s satanic character, depending as it did on what Nehru 
repeatedly described as his politics of negation, made him quite different from 
and indeed more devilish than the Devil himself. And this had to do with his 
refusal to tempt anyone—just as he was famously beyond all temptation. Jinnah 
certainly advocated the cause of Pakistan, but without ever painting it in the 
bright colours of utopia, as Congressmen were always doing for their vision of 
India. No doubt Muslim League propaganda came to develop its own rhetoric of 
a glorious if thoroughly ambiguous future, but Jinnah only ever spoke of 
Pakistan in terms of dry principles. So we often hear of those who were con-
vinced by the mesmeric force of his personality suddenly losing faith in Jinnah’s 
arguments once they were no longer in his presence.23  
In fact Jinnah himself admitted to being stirred by the seductions of 
Congress rhetoric, and so like Ulysses he not only chained himself to the mast of 
his political principles in order to resist the siren song of Indian nationalism, but 
had to make sure that his associates were protected from its temptations as 
well.24 During their talks of 1944, for example, Jinnah indignantly refused to 
allow Gandhi to address the League’s working committee, since both the 
Mahatma and he seem to have realized the effect of Congress’s temptations 
upon even the highest officials of the Muslim League.25 And indeed Jinnah had 
regularly to rein in his men when they appeared to be leaning too closely in 
Congress’s direction.  
Eventually it seems to have been a fear of the “Hindu Raj” Jinnah was 
constantly mentioning that came to dominate the popular imagination of India’s 
Muslims, not any vision of a utopian future in Pakistan. But despite the 
increasing tempo of communal violence across the country, did this fear actually 
refer to any lived experience? Jinnah’s accusations of Congress perfidy, at least 
until the Bihar riots of 1946, in which some ten thousand Muslims were killed, 
tended to rely upon infractions of principle rather than any real instances of 
persecution, which were after all to be found on both sides of the religious 
divide. The absence of any solid proof regarding Congress tyranny prompted his 
contention that Congress forced all those under its provincial governments to 
23  For an example see HUSAIN, 1976: 76. 
24  See, for instance, KHURSHID, 1990: 53. 
25  ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE, 1944: 46–47. 
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sing its anthem as the national anthem, salute its flag as the national flag, 
abandon the Urdu language favoured by North Indian Muslims for Hindi and 
reverence India as a Hindu goddess in a song taken from a famously anti-
Muslim novel of the nineteenth century. And when he did describe the miseries 
of “Hindu Raj” the only example Jinnah could proffer of its malignity had to do 
with discrimination and oppression among Hindu castes, so that he ended up 
asking Muslims to see their own future in the present misery of the 
“Untouchables.” It was a curiously vicarious fear, in other words, one that may 
also have recognized the low caste status of the vast majority of India’s 
Muslims.     
But if Jinnah disdained tempting either his friends or enemies with glorious 
visions of the future, it was his own immunity to temptation that truly made 
Jinnah into a satanic figure, one who famously refused Gandhi’s offer that he 
should become the first prime minister of an independent India. Indeed he had 
similarly dismissed the Mahatma’s desire that the League take the lead in 
forming an anti-Congress opposition in 1939, once Congress governments had 
resigned office in protest against India being taken into the Second World War 
without her consultation.26 Like Jinnah himself, Gandhi seems to have realized 
by the close of the 1930s that Congress was not India’s sole representative, and 
that a quasi-democratic politics had already emerged in colonial India, with the 
existence of opposition parties that could not be reduced to creations of the 
British. So when a number of these parties, including the Hindu Mahasabha and 
the Muslim League came together to celebrate a “Day of Deliverance” once 
Congress resigned office, the Mahatma wrote to Jinnah recommending that he 
lead an opposition that might well assume government in an independent India.27  
Gandhi had understood that as India’s biggest opposition party, the Muslim 
League had come to set the pattern and model for all the others. Dalits or 
“Untouchables”, for instance, who were a minority everywhere in the country, 
adopted the League’s pre-Pakistan politics of positive discrimination and con-
stitutional safeguards, while the non-Brahmin movement of the South adopted a 
Pakistani rhetoric of regional autonomy and even secession. Jinnah, of course, 
spurned all such attempts to lure him back to Indian nationalism, though he also 
appears to have held back from pressing his advantage and working towards the 
political fragmentation of India. Thus his attempts from the days of exile to build 
an alliance of minorities were abandoned once Jinnah opted for Pakistan, and he 
26  PIRZADA, 1966: 415. 
27  PIRZADA, 1966: 411–413. 
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went out of his way to refuse support to low caste movements claiming auto-
nomy, as much as to potentially secessionist agitations in different parts of the 
country. Was this because Jinnah wanted to be the only one to defy Congress, or 
because he envisioned his role as being to defend India from fragmentation as 
much as to subject her to it?    
The last Indian 
Jinnah was reluctant to utter the final word confirming India’s partition, which 
has made historians speculate that he did not really want a separation after all. 
This, I think, is an illegitimate argument, though Jinnah was certainly displeased 
with the way in which India and Pakistan eventually came to be created. He used 
to say that the last word was never spoken in politics, and this idea Jinnah 
apparently took so much to heart that the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, could only 
manage to extort a slight inclination of the head from him as a sign of agreement 
to India’s partition and the creation of Pakistan.28 Hesitating at the last moment 
to take responsibility for the momentous future he had been instrumental in 
making for the Subcontinent, it seemed as if Jinnah wanted to assure himself of 
saving India by the same token as he would free Pakistan, since he thought of 
himself as being the well-wisher of both countries. We have already noted his 
reluctance to participate in the wider fragmentation of India as far as supporting 
caste and regional movements was concerned, and during the transfer of power 
Jinnah similarly appears to have made very little effort to bring the princes or 
Sikhs into his camp if only to discomfit India.  
For his was a politics of principle, and what delighted Jinnah most about 
the emergence of two new states out of the Raj was that he thought such a 
double independence represented an achievement unprecedented in history, one 
in which these states had come into being not by war or revolution but as the 
result of negotiations among civilians that might be described as a social 
contract.29 The violence that soon broke out among refugees shifting in either 
direction disturbed Jinnah primarily because it tarnished this great achievement, 
with the movement of Hindus and Sikhs out of Pakistan serving to annul it 
altogether, since without minorities Pakistan no longer had any political meaning 
as India’s counterpart. In fact he blamed the exodus on Congress, which Jinnah 
28  For an example see AHMAD, 1942: 123–124. 
29  BURKE, 2000: 73. 
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thought was deliberately spreading fears among Pakistan’s minorities in order to 
pull them out of the country and thus destroy it.30  
Revealing his abstract and idealistic notion of politics, Jinnah spoke re-
peatedly during this period about forgetting the past and starting anew, as if 
history and experience could be undone so easily and by an act of will.31 But 
then he had never paid history much attention and was taken up instead by 
matters of principle above all. The violence that accompanied the independence 
of India and Pakistan served only to betray Jinnah’s utopian desires for the 
future, signalling as it did the beginning of a war between the two countries that 
has been going on now, sometimes openly and sometimes surreptitiously, for 
over sixty years. And indeed the partition of India provoked the famously cold 
and unsentimental Jinnah to shed public tears for only the second time in his life, 
the first being at the grave of his estranged young wife.32 Like the Devil himself 
in Iqbal’s rendering, Mohammad Ali Jinnah ended up as a tragic hero, undone 
by the very idealism of his politics.    
Even the most fervent nationalists among his Pakistani biographers have 
tended to see failure and tragedy in Jinnah’s last year, not only because of the 
“moth eaten” country the Qaid famously said he had been given by a partition 
whose geography was entirely decided by the British, nor even because of the 
violence of Partition, but given his own marginalization in the new country he 
had done more than anybody else to bring into existence. Like Gandhi in this 
respect, who was also sidelined once India had become independent, Jinnah 
found himself with a great deal of constitutional power in Karachi, but isolated 
from his own government which had begun playing regional power-politics from 
a new base in Lahore. Dying of tuberculosis, Jinnah appears to have lost the 
affection of numbers of his people in places like Bengal or Baluchistan.33 And 
eventually he probably even started fearing his own fellow-Pakistanis and co-
religionists.  
Jinnah had always pooh-poohed threats of assassination, and had once even 
been known to coolly wrest a knife from the hand of a would-be assassin who 
had slipped into his Bombay house. So despite warnings from the police and 
intelligence services that he might be targeted by Sikh or Hindu assassins, Jinnah 
insisted on riding in an open coach or unprotected car and refused to have walls 
30  See BURKE, 2000: 59, 63, 70, and 75. 
31  See, for instance, BURKE, 2000: 22. 
32  KHAN, 1976: 44. 
33  AL MUJAHID, 2007: 18. 
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built around his official residence in Karachi. During the ceremonial coach ride 
with Lord Mountbatten on the day when he was vested with the powers of 
Governor-General, Jinnah had annoyed the Viceroy, who was after all a military 
man, by claiming to have brought him through the event without an assassin-
nation attempt.34 But this courage was premised upon the supposition that the 
Qaid enjoyed the complete devotion of his people. On the very day that Gandhi 
was assassinated by a fellow-Hindu, who accused him of betraying India to 
Muslim Pakistan, Jinnah asked for walls to be built around his residence.35 Had 
he realized that the threat of assassination came from one’s own people rather 
than their professed enemies?  
In any case it was the Mahatma who, in what the Qaid might have de-
scribed as his last trick, ended up dying as a martyr for Pakistan and thus 
depriving Jinnah of that particular privilege. For Gandhi had been assassinated 
by a Hindu nationalist just before he set out on a pilgrimage to Pakistan, and was 
seen by his murderer as being so sympathetic to Muslims as to have practically 
offered them a state of their own. So it was no wonder that the Qaid’s per-
functory statement of regret for the death of his old rival emphasized Gandhi’s 
character as a great leader of the Hindus alone.36 Jinnah’s own death had none of 
the public drama that Gandhi’s did, though it occurred as a piece of theatre in the 
kind of intimate space that he so enjoyed dominating. Flown back to Karachi 
from the hill resort of Ziarat, Jinnah suffered anonymously in an ambulance that 
had broken down on a road choked by the ramshackle vehicles and pitiful 
belongings of Muslim refugees coming from India. It was in some sense a fitting 
end to one of the most remarkable political careers of modern times that the 
leader who had always been an outsider, should die as one among the wretched-
ness of the people he had done more than anybody else to put on the map of the 
world.   
Conclusion 
Every biographer of the Qaid-e-Azam, like every historian of Pakistan, has 
wondered how a man as unrepresentative of Muslim norms in India as Jinnah 
was, should have become the most popular leader of his community. They have 
34  WOLPERT, 1984: 342. 
35  BOLITHO, 1954: 210. 
36  BURKE, 2000: 99. 
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either dismissed his background and personality as inessential to the narrative of 
Pakistan’s independence, or made Jinnah out to be more conventional than his 
contemporaries believed, whether as a Muslim or a “brown Englishman”. But if 
we are to take biography seriously as a genre, neither of these options should be 
available to us, for the Qaid’s character stands front and centre in all the 
accounts we have of him, each one of which strives to showcase his departure 
from the accepted standards of any culture. Even Gandhi, with all his originality 
and eccentricity, can be said to have represented a certain type as a political 
icon, if only that of a holy man or “half-naked fakir”, as Churchill famously 
called him. And though it was always the Mahatma who was accused by his 
detractors of hypocritically playing a part, Jinnah has a much truer claim to 
making politics into a piece of theatre. 
Yet the Qaid embodied no generic type, and in this way alone could he 
come to represent a Muslim community in which no group was able to speak for 
another. We might say it was the lack of hegemony in Muslim politics that made 
Jinnah possible as the kind of political icon he became, one whose own sectarian 
and regional background was both heretical and marginal enough to make him 
into a politician with no “natural” constituency. As someone absolutely singular 
and therefore satanic, he turned out to be the most appropriate leader for a dis-
persed community that possessed little political integrity. It was the need to 
reject blood-and-soil forms of nationalism that allowed the Muslim League to fix 
on a purely abstract national identity, one that made for a theatrical politics in 
which ideas and principles stalked the stage. Superficial because detached from 
narratives of national authenticity, and tenacious because based upon “logic” and 
ideas, Muslim nationalism found itself personified in the figure of Jinnah, who 
represented his people as a lawyer did his clients, by reducing the messiness of 
their quotidian actions to a set of pure ideals.     
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